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NUCLEAR PROPULSION OF MERCHANT SHIPS  
– ASPECTS OF RISK AND REGULATION  
 
John Carlton, Vince Jenkins and Bob Smart 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Following its exploitation in submarines and aircraft carriers, nuclear propulsion was introduced into merchant 
ships in the 1960s. These developments were for the most part successful in their technical achievement, but 
commercially less so. Notwithstanding this early scenario, there has been a steady, although low level, 
development of nuclear propulsion in the intervening years, which has mostly centred on icebreakers but has 
also included some other merchant ship types.   
 
Current concerns over CO2 emissions and other air pollutants have awakened interest within the marine 
industry in nuclear propulsion. This paper considers some of the aspects of Lloyd’s Register’s research and 
development studies relating to the nuclear propulsion of merchant ships. After establishing the background to 
nuclear power at sea, the paper discusses the subject of the safety, risk and regulation aspects that the wider 
marine industry may have questions about with regard to nuclear propulsion. A companion paper will address 
the science, technology and engineering aspects in the near future.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In keeping with many other industries, both within 
the transport and other sectors, the marine industry 
is seeking ways to reduce carbon and other 
emissions from ships. MARPOL Annex VI and the 
moves towards a Carbon Index bear testament to 
these initiatives. While much valuable research is 
being undertaken in different areas of two and four-
stroke diesel engine technology, together with 
parallel work in the context of fuel cells and wind 
propulsion power augmentation [1], it is pertinent 
to pose the question of whether nuclear propulsion 
has some potential for merchant ship propulsion 
[2]. If so, then carbon, NOX, SOX, HC and particulate 
emissions could be reduced to zero, certainly as far 
as ship operation is concerned. Moreover, the 
complementary developments for naval ships and 
submarines have demonstrated an enviable safety 
record, and land based installations have, apart 
from two major isolated incidents, been safely 
generating electric power for many years.    
 
This paper addresses the safety, risk and regulatory 
aspects of nuclear propulsion, while a companion 
paper [3] considers the science, technology and 
engineering aspects of nuclear power within the 
marine industry. 
 
2. HISTORY 
 
It is about 55 years since the first nuclear reactor 
was brought to power on the submarine USS 
Nautilus. This boat used a single pressurised water 
reactor (PWR) and this development led to the Skate 
Class submarines and the aircraft carrier USS 
Enterprise in 1960. This latter ship was powered by 
eight reactors and is still in service.   
 
The 20,000 dwt Lenin, which entered service in 1959 
and remained in service for 30 years until her hull 
deteriorated to a point beyond economic repair, was 
the world’s first nuclear powered icebreaker. She 
was finally powered by two 171 MWt OK-900 
reactors which delivered 34 MW at the propellers. 
 
The USS Long Beach followed in 1961 and one year 
later the US Navy had a fleet of 26 nuclear powered 
submarines in service with some 30 under 
construction. HMS Dreadnaught, the Royal Navy’s 
first nuclear powered submarine, completed sea 
trials in 1962. This boat used American nuclear 
propulsion technology and, while the US 
technology was shared with the United Kingdom, 
the Chinese, French and Russian developments of 
marine nuclear propulsion technology proceeded 
separately.  
 
In the case of merchant ships, during the 1950s the 
development of designs for nuclear propelled ships 
commenced and in 1962 the first merchant ship, the 
NS Savannah, was commissioned. This ship had an 
installed power of 21,000 shp and was capable of 21 
knots; although she performed well technically, she 
was not economically viable at the time and was 
decommissioned some eight years after entering 
service. The Otto Hahn, which was both a cargo ship 
and research facility, followed Savannah into service 
and also experienced little in the way of technical 
difficulties over her ten year life span as a nuclear 
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propelled ship but, again, she also proved too 
expensive to operate commercially. Subsequently, 
the Otto Hahn was converted to diesel propulsion.  
A third ship, the Mutsu was less fortuitous and 
suffered a number of technical and political 
problems. All three of these pioneering merchant 
ships used reactors with low-enriched uranium fuel 
having 3.7 to 4.4% 235U.   
 
The success of the Lenin led to the Arktika Class of 
ice breakers in 1975. The propulsion systems of 
these ships were capable of delivering 54 MW at the 
propeller from two OK-900 reactors having a 
capability of 171 MWt each. As such, the ships were 
capable of operating in deep Arctic waters: indeed, 
Arktica was the first ship to reach the North Pole in 
1977. Of this class, the Rossija, Sovetskiy Soyuz and 
Yamel were still in service towards the end of 2008 
with the Yamal offering passenger cruises towards 
the North Pole. More recently the NS 50 Let Povbedy 
(Figure 1) was commissioned in 2007. This 
icebreaker is an upgrade of the Arktika Class, having 
a displacement of 25840 tonnes, and is designed to 
break through ice up to 2.8 metres thick. The 
installed power is 75,000 shp and is powered by two 
nuclear reactors. The ship, whose speed in open 
water is 21.4 knots, doubles as an icebreaker and 
arctic passenger cruise ship, having 64 cabins.   
 
In 1988, the Sevmorput, a fourth nuclear merchant 
ship, was commissioned in Russia (Figure 2).  It is a 
lash barge carrier and container ship, 260 metres in 
length and fitted with an ice breaking bow. It has 
operated successfully on the Northern Sea route 
serving the Siberian ports and is powered by a KLT-
40 135 MWt reactor similar to that used in the larger 
ice breakers. This propulsion system delivers 32.5 
MW at the propeller and has required refuelling 
only once up to 2003. 
 
Figure 1:  NS 50 Let Povbedy (50 Years of Victory). 
As a precursor to the Sevmorput and other 
icebreaker developments, the Russians developed 
both PWR and lead-bismuth cooled reactor 
designs. The PWR designs became the predominant 
type of reactor and four generations of designs were 
developed with the last entering service in 1995 in 
the Severodvinsk Class of submarine. Nevertheless, 
the largest Russian boats were the Typhoon Class 
which were powered by twin 190 MWt PWR 
reactors; however, these were superseded by the 
Oscar II Class using the same power plant.   
 
Continuing this development, two Taymyr Class 
shallow draught icebreakers of 18,260 dwt were 
launched in 1989 for use in estuarial waters. 
 Looking to the future, a Russian 110 MW 
icebreaker is planned together with further dual-
draught vessels delivering 60 MW at the propellers.   
 
 
Figure 2: N.S. Sevmorput. 
 
In response to the early developments in nuclear 
propulsion for merchant ships, Lloyd’s Register 
produced Provisional Rules for the Classification of 
Nuclear Ships [4] in 1966. These Rules embraced 
requirements for the hull, pressure vessels and 
components, reactor engineering and control in 
addition to requirements for complementary 
installations and survey and maintenance. These 
Rules, although maintained during their existence, 
were withdrawn in 1976 due to the lack of 
widespread application of the technology in 
merchant ships. However, currently there are some 
600 nuclear reactors in operation, of which nearly 
one third are used in the marine environment. 
 
Set against this background, some three years ago 
Lloyd’s Register began to consider whether the 
concept of nuclear propulsion for merchant ships 
had potential merit, given the design and 
operational experience accrued in the naval and 
power generation sectors over the last half century.  
The concept study initially examined the technical 
design issues surrounding a number of ship types, 
including container ships, cruise ships, tankers and 
bulk carriers. In addition, the relationship of these 
ships to existing international conventions and 
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codes was considered, as were the risk issues 
surrounding a nuclear installation on board a 
trading merchant ship. 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS AND 
DRIVERS 
It is highly probable that any use of nuclear 
powered merchant vessels will be inextricably 
linked to the environment. Such an environmental 
linkage will be either through simply wanting to be 
visibly green, with little or no emissions from the 
ships stacks, or as a result of carbon tax and the 
simple economics of operating nuclear powered 
vessels. The British government has recently 
produced a memorandum detailing options for 
decarbonising Britain by 2050. This is not a 
complete removal of carbon production from the 
UK, but an expected 30 to 50% reduction depending 
on how the accounting is done. The memorandum 
was undertaken under the leadership of Prof. David 
J C MacKay FRS, via the Commons select committee 
environmental audit. The full document can be 
viewed at the government’s parliamentary web site 
[5] under parliamentary business. The last and most 
relevant paragraph reads as follows:  
“5.10. International shipping 
International shipping is quite an efficient user of 
fossil fuels, but perhaps we should plan to 
defossilize it too. (In 2002, Britain's share of 
international shipping used a power of 10 GW; that 
corresponds to a significant fraction of the UK's 
carbon budget for 2050.) In plan C, Britain restarts 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for 
Peace" initiative, building and maintaining a new 
fleet of nuclear-powered container ships and 
passenger ships.” 
It is highly likely that other governments are also 
considering similar options to reduce their own CO2 
production.  Indeed, testament to this is the current 
level of interest that is being shown by owners and 
builders around the world in nuclear propulsion.   
 
4. HEALTH IMPLICATIONS 
It is known that large doses of ionising radiation 
can cause increased incidences of cancer and 
leukaemia in the population over time. 
Furthermore, evidence from experiments on 
animals and plants suggests that smaller doses of 
ionising radiation may also cause genetic mutations 
to occur; however, there has been no evidence of 
this in humans. While embryos are sensitive to 
radiation damage, the amount of damage caused by 
radiation will depend on many factors, typically: 
1. the actual dose received 
2. the dosage rate 
3. the type of radiation experienced 
4. the age of the person 
5. the state of health of the individual 
6. the part of the body which suffers exposure. 
For most people, the principal exposure to radiation 
is from naturally occurring background sources. 
These levels are typically in the range of 1.5 to 3.5 
mSv/year but in certain geographical areas they can 
rise to in excess of 50 mSv/year. As such, the doses 
received by members of the public during their 
lifetime can reach several Sv.  Figure 3, as an 
example of the sources of radiation, defines typical 
exposure in the United States of America. While it 
might be plausible that a very small dose of 
radiation may pose a risk to human health, as with 
natural sources of exposure, there is no scientific 
evidence that short term doses of up to between 50 
and 100 mSv/yr pose a threat. Indeed, at dose rates 
of up to about 10 mSv/yr, there is some evidence to 
suggest that beneficial effects may arise. 
 
Figure 3:  Sources of 
radiation exposure in  
the United States [6]. 
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Dosage Comment 
50mSv/yr This is the dose rate which naturally occurs in some places on the Earth; for 
example Iran.  
100 mSv/yr This is the lowest level at which any increase in cancer becomes evident; 
above this level the probability of a cancer occurrence increases with dose 
level. 
1,000 
mSv/cumulative 
If encountered in a short term dose, this is around the threshold for inducing 
immediate but temporary radiation sickness in an average person, but would 
be unlikely to cause death. The estimated risk of a fatal cancer developing at 
some time in the future at this level of radiation is of the order of 5 in every 
100 people exposed. 
Single dose greater 
than 1,000 mSv 
Immediate effects would be temporary nausea and decreased white blood cell 
count. Between 2,000 and 10,000 mSv, when encountered in a short term dose, 
severe radiation sickness would result, with an increasing likelihood that this 
would be fatal. 
A single dose of 
5,000 mSv 
Radiation at this level would kill about half those receiving the dose within a 
month. 
A single dose of 
10,000 mSv 
If experienced as a short-term and whole body dose, this would cause 
immediate nausea and decreased white blood cell count as well as death 
within a few weeks. 
 
Table 1: Likely health consequences of radiation exposure. 
 
In the case of higher radiation dosages, some 
guidance can be derived from Table 1, which 
endeavours to correlate health effects with 
dosage parameters. Clearly, some variation in the 
anticipated effects can be expected depending 
upon the specific physiological characteristics of 
the person involved. 
 
There will naturally be concern from the marine 
industry with regard to exposure to radiation. 
Within naval nuclear practice, each crewman 
wears a dosimeter, a device that measures levels 
of exposure to radiation at all times. Each man's 
dosimeter is checked periodically to enable the 
navy to monitor how much radiation each man 
has been exposed to in relation to strict controls 
that are in-place to minimise exposure.  
 
5. NUCLEAR POWER RISK – BOTH REAL 
AND PERCIEVED 
 
Is the public right to be concerned about nuclear 
power? Perhaps. It certainly is an industry which, if 
the facilities are incorrectly designed, operated and 
maintained, has very significant incident 
consequences for any population in its vicinity. The 
same is true of the chemical industry, or a few other 
high hazard industries, in as much as the 
consequences of an incident are significant. 
 
There is a huge amount of effort put into ensuring 
the design, operation and maintenance standards of 
modern reactors are second to none and that the 
probabilities of an incident are remote. What is 
certain is that all energy production systems carry 
risks. There are two key differences, however, in 
terms of how the public perceives the nuclear 
industry, when compared to other industries:  
 
1) The unseen killer 
 
The first is that is it very easy to see and understand 
the implications of what might be called 
conventional or traditional hazards; for example, an 
explosion or fire. While such consequences are 
hugely destructive, people have generally had some 
degree of personal experience of such consequences 
in their life and how to manage them. The public 
believes the effects of conventional industries are 
understood, visible and tangible and people know 
what to do in escaping their effects. By contrast 
radiation is the unseen killer. If the dose is below 
1000mSv, you are completely unaware that you are 
being exposed to radiation; it does not hurt and 
there is no sensation when you are exposed to it. 
The effects are generally not immediate, unless you 
are exposed to very significant doses: even then it is 
hours or days rather than seconds or minutes. The 
effects are typically revealed in later life as cancers. 
Radioactive contamination can lay unseen, or be 
airborne, and no one would know it is present 
without the right measuring equipment. It is 
insidious. Life typically does not equip the 
individual with the ability to identify, 
understand and take action to protect themselves 
from radiation.  
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Figure 4: Comparison of perceptions of the public and MPs.  
 
2) A nuclear bomb 
The public generally has little appreciation of the 
difference between a nuclear weapon and a nuclear 
power plant. Lack of education by the industry and 
society has resulted in the public generally equating 
the worse case incident at a nuclear power station to 
that of a nuclear explosion. This could not be 
further from the truth. It is impossible to have a 
nuclear explosion in the core of a civil nuclear 
power station. One of the perception issues is surely 
related to comparison with other forms of energy. 
For instance, people know that petrol will explode if 
handled incorrectly, but its energy release is 
controlled in a car engine. The public knows petrol 
can be useful but also destructive. The same 
assumption is not true of a nuclear weapon and 
power plant. Civil nuclear power plant fuel, the 
core, can not generate a nuclear weapon explosion. 
The complexity of nuclear power technology has its 
draw backs when trying to convey it to the general 
public. Most people’s appreciation of the scale of 
nuclear weapons is based on images from World 
War II, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, and the 
scale of devastation. The principal destructive force, 
however, of nuclear weapons is not radiation, as the 
public perceive; it is the pressure or thermal wave, 
and flying debris. Radiation is only present as a by 
product of splitting the atom.  
At what point the public has come to the view 
above is hard to discern. Nuclear incidents such as 
Three Mile Island in the US, which had no effect on 
the population at all, through to Chernobyl in the 
former USSR, which had a huge effect on the local 
population and has contaminated large tracts of 
land, have certainly influenced the public. How the 
media has chosen to portray the nuclear industry 
has also had a significant impact on shaping the 
public view. It is interesting to look at the findings 
of a study conducted by the Nuclear Industries 
Association in Figure 4.  
Clench [7] when conducting a limited survey of 
people’s attitudes to nuclear power as a suitable 
alternative for ship propulsion in general, recorded 
that 57.4% of his sample of 64 members of the 
public agreed with the proposition. As such, this 
tends to support the findings shown in Figure 4. 
Perhaps the fallibility of humans and confidence 
levels in complex engineered systems is also a 
contributor to how the public perceives nuclear 
power. 
 
The marine industry is now at the very earliest 
stages of looking again at nuclear power in 
merchant ships. How will the public and the marine 
industry view this? What are the issues or hazards, 
perceived or factual, which will need to be 
addressed and managed? While the real and 
perceived issues will be many, a high level view can 
be gained from looking at the substantive 
differences in culture, design, operation, 
maintenance, decommissioning and the costs of 
nuclear and conventionally powered ships. 
 
Culture 
 
 Safety culture  
A similarly exacting safety culture that is 
present in the civil and military nuclear power 
world would be required. While the marine 
industry has achieved different safety cultures 
and standards, for example in the transport of 
LNG, the culture required for a nuclear 
powered ship clearly extends beyond those staff 
operating the plant.  It would have to pervade 
the whole operating, owning and regulating 
structure. The initial capital costs to invest and 
develop the technology would typically only 
attract those owners who have a longer term, 
strategic and typically high safety culture. 
Various models could be envisaged for the 
supply and qualification of ships’ staff; 
however, it is without doubt that the companies 
supporting both the civil and military nuclear 
power sectors would be key to the development 
of the required culture.  
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 Training regime  
Quite different regimes have been achieved in 
the merchant sector, as seen in LNG operation. 
The industry would have to look towards the 
civil and military nuclear industry for support 
in this area. Clearly, engineers would have to 
become nuclear experienced and qualified. The 
deck staff would also have to have an 
appreciation of the technology. Given the 
differences between seagoing merchant and 
naval engineering training, the present 
merchant training would require significant 
modification. In the case of naval engineers and 
artificers, they receive specialised courses of 
instruction in nuclear engineering. A solution to 
the merchant marine problem might be 
obtained in a number of ways, each of which 
would need detailed exploration. One option 
might be to train merchant marine engineering 
officers in a similar way to naval engineering 
staff, recognising that a merchant officer 
generally comprises an amalgam of the naval 
officer and artificer models. An alternative 
solution could be to split the engineering staff 
into nuclear and general engineering staffs 
where the chief engineer would clearly need to 
be nuclear-trained. Yet a third alternative may 
be to encourage manufacturers of nuclear 
propulsion plant to offer an engineering 
solution whereby, in addition to supplying the 
plant, they also provide though-life operator 
and service support to a shipowner.  Such a 
model is consistent with the discussion on the 
regulatory environment. 
 
 Employment regime  
The current short term contract regime of the 
merchant world would undermine developing 
and maintaining the very high safety culture 
required to support a nuclear merchant marine. 
There would clearly need to be a longer term 
commitment by the owner or operator to the 
employee, and accordingly the owner or 
operator would want to ensure that the 
significant money invested in training and 
competence was not in vain.  
 
 Health physics capability and responsibility 
The health and safety aspects associated with 
nuclear power, for example nuclear medicine, 
would also have to be developed both shore 
side and on the ship. International guidance is 
established through the International Atomic 
Energy Authority (IAEA) and each country has 
its own implementation of the IAEA guidance. 
Health physicists have deep expertise, just as in 
any technical or medical discipline. The person 
on board ship would not need to be a health 
physicist: rather, a person who is dual trained 
to the degree necessary, much like someone 
who is first aid trained.  
 
Design and build 
 
One view is that, at a high level, the nuclear plant 
could be dropped into the prime mover’s place in 
the engine room. While this may be overly 
simplistic, there are not so many differences or 
implications for the technology: the principal areas 
being reactor shielding, primary and secondary 
circuits and considerable robustness of the control 
and instrumentation systems. The majority of the 
design build aspects are discussed in [3].  
 
Maintenance 
 
How merchant ships are maintained has changed 
significantly over the last 20 to 30 years. There are a 
number of reasons for this, with system complexity 
and the degree of specialist knowledge required 
being key. Ships’ maintenance is now typically 
undertaken by suppliers, such as engine or control 
systems manufacturers. Nuclear plant has always 
been complex, but unlike other sectors, the use of 
PC systems for control is held at a relatively low 
level due to the predictability of failure modes. The 
use of spares not from the original manufacturer is 
a source of concern for many industries, including 
the marine industry. The integrity of spares and 
components for nuclear plant must be 
unquestionable and, again, is further discussed in 
[3]. It is highly probable that the original supplier of 
the nuclear plant would provide through-life 
maintenance and support for the plant, ensuring the 
integrity of the components and quality of 
maintenance.  
 
Operation 
 
 Health physics monitoring.  
This would be a new discipline required on 
board ship and within the company. The ship 
board role would cover two aspects: normal 
day to day monitoring of the dose burden, and 
the care of people after any unplanned 
exposure. Depending on the company size and 
number of nuclear ships, there may be a 
requirement for a full time health physicist 
shore side.  
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 Manning  
Twenty four hour watch keeping of nuclear 
plant is the norm. The rationale for this is the 
ability to respond quickly by operators that are 
fully awake; as opposed to those who have just 
been dragged from deep sleep and have to 
make their way to the engine control room and 
make potentially critical decisions on plant 
safety. At the present time, all reactor plants are 
attended by watch-keepers at all times: this is 
true whether the plant be land or sea-based. 
Typically, in a land based power station there 
may be 100 watch-keepers assigned to a plant; 
however, it must be remembered their watch-
keeping rota is very different to that 
encountered on a naval ship where the normal 
sea watch regime of 1 in 3 is in place. This 
permits a considerably lower number of 
qualified staff to be required at sea. The 
question naturally arises as to whether the 
unmanned machinery spaces concept would be 
valid for a nuclear powered merchant ship. In 
the short, or indeed medium, term this is 
thought to be unlikely. This is because, 
although nuclear plant control systems are 
becoming considerably more sophisticated as 
witnessed by the new third generation reactor 
designs [3], there is still some considerable 
experience to be gained with these control 
systems before such a move could be 
confidently made. Undoubtedly, however, this 
experience will first be gained with land-based 
installations and then, to some extent, 
transferred to marine practice. It must also be 
remembered that marine systems are 
considerably smaller than their land-based 
counterparts and, therefore, the response of the 
marine system is potentially likely to be faster.  
  
 Radiation Shielding  
The shielding of people from ionizing radiation 
from a core is achieved by lead and polythene 
within the ship. Water is a very good moderator 
and shield from radiation. If a reactor 
compartment is in contact with the ship’s side, 
below the water line, no additional physical 
shield is provided. Accessing, or close 
proximity to, the underside of a ship would 
then have to be restricted in normal operation, 
for example when the vessel is in port. If the 
reactor was shut down while in port, the dose 
burden through the hull would be minimal and 
associated with decay heat. If the reactor was 
operational for cargo operations, or hotel loads, 
then the dose burden, through the hull, would 
be considerable. This may have implications for 
any diving operations associated with surveys. 
   
 Dry dock and refuelling facilities  
The dry docking of nuclear powered ships 
would include items not normally seen in the 
merchant marine. The largest issue is most 
probably the timescales involved in dealing 
with the reactors’ decay heat: the spent fuel 
remains hot and needs to be cooled 
continuously. In this sense, decay heat is rather 
like a kettle after is has boiled. Unlike a kettle, 
however, where the heat dissipates in minutes, 
a reactor core will continue producing heat for 
hours or days depending on how used the core 
is. This amount of heat is considerable and has 
to be removed, with the ultimate heat sink, via 
cooling systems, being the sea. Hence, docking 
a vessel has to be a much more controlled 
evolution and one which would take longer 
than a conventionally powered vessel. Nuclear 
refuelling happens far less often than bunkering 
and while bunkering has its hazards, nuclear 
refuelling requires even more design and 
process rigor. New fuel is relatively easy to 
move about from a radiological perspective. 
Spent fuel, however, has significant radiological 
and health physics issues. Typically, this 
involves shielding and the transfer of the spent 
fuel within a controlled water bath from the 
ship to the storage facility. Hence, the dry dock 
would need to have considerable additional 
features to cope with refuelling. The time 
period involved in refuelling could, however, 
most probably tie into the five-year survey 
period; detailed reactor design would dictate 
this. 
 
 Ports and local population 
Public opinion is a hugely powerful force in a 
democracy. Cold ironing, the supply of shore 
side electrical power while in port, was 
pioneered in Alaska, at least from a merchant 
marine perspective. The drive was from the 
local population who could see the visible 
exhaust gas emissions. The same has happened 
in San Francisco and other Californian ports, 
where increased pockets of cancers appear 
around ports, particularly container terminals. 
Cold ironing is being discussed and imposed by 
the ports on the ship operators. The local 
councils, who issue the port operating licences, 
have responded to public pressure and concern 
over hot spots of cancer. The ports from which 
nuclear ships operate will be exposed to public 
concern, be it from real or perceived issues. 
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While robust approaches to understanding the 
risks of nuclear powered ships entering a 
specific port will have to be undertaken, such as 
that undertaken for LNG terminals in 
populated areas, remote port locations for 
nuclear ships are likely to be much more 
politically acceptable.  
 
 Public perception  
The acceptability of nuclear powered vessels in 
a country’s sovereign waters, from both the 
regulator’s and public’s perspective, is an area 
that has been mentioned several times. If we 
ignore the fact that nuclear powered vessels 
have traded globally in the past, so clearly 
precedence has been established several 
decades ago, there is a case for acceptability of 
nuclear powered merchant vessels today. The 
NS 50 Years of Victory, a Russian-registered 
icebreaker, is currently marketed by several 
companies which offer adventure cruises to the 
Artic. The vessel carries up to 128 fare paying 
passengers and sails from Murmansk in Russia 
during the Northern Hemisphere’s summer 
period. This illustrates that at least one flag 
state today is happy with nuclear powered 
vessels entering its territorial waters, and that 
there are members of the public who are happy 
to be on such a vessel. The companies selling 
the adventure cruises are very open about the 
vessel’s source of power, as can be seen from 
their marketing literature which contains 
detailed information about the ship and its 
propulsion systems.  
   
 Terrorist threat  
This will be a real issue as far as the public are 
concerned. The fact is that it may be more one 
of perception. But nevertheless, a terrorist could 
use the perceived risk as a real threat. In the 
current environment piracy is such an example. 
The public perception of the leverage Somali 
pirates, for example, could achieve for the 
capture of a nuclear powered vessel would be 
immense. There would be some factual 
concerns about nuclear safety: was the plant 
shut down properly? There would also be a 
concern about the use of the reactor fuel in 
weapons: either nuclear weapons or dirty 
bombs. Removing nuclear fuel from a reactor is 
not the same as siphoning fuel out of a car’s fuel 
tank. It is much more complicated, involving 
significant engineering capabilities. Even if the 
fuel were removed, to create a nuclear weapon 
requires industrial equipment that only a few 
countries in the world posses. It is highly 
improbable that any merchant marine core 
design would hold sufficient fissile material to 
make a nuclear weapon. A dirty bomb is not a 
nuclear weapon; conventional explosives are 
used to propel contaminated material, typically 
highly radioactive material, into the 
atmosphere. In the case of a dirty bomb, the raw 
fuel material from a nuclear powered ship 
could be used. The vessel could possibly also be 
used as a target by a missile, the objective being 
to create panic from many sources.  
Alternatively, blocking a sea lane with a nuclear 
propelled ship might be seen as a propaganda 
coup, with the target being impact on trade, 
finance and stock markets, as well as panic to 
the local population from a perception of 
contaminated water and the like. The facts 
however are quite different. A reactor pressure 
vessel is a hefty thing, capable of withstanding 
the pressure of immense depth and it typically 
would be water filled, hence incompressible. 
The majority of the energy of a missile would 
be expended in penetrating the ship’s side, with 
little harm being done to the reactor itself due 
to its construction. Experience from armour 
piercing shells used against tanks is that the 
war head, after penetrating the tank, simply 
rattles around the inside of the tank – killing the 
occupants but doing little damage otherwise. 
 
Decommissioning 
 
The decommissioning of a nuclear facility is very 
different to the scrapping of a ship. 
Decommissioning would have several implications 
for the marine industry: 
 
 The cost of decommissioning. 
 The ownership of contaminated waste after 
decommissioning. 
 Facilities to physically undertake 
decommissioning.  
 
One view is that the merchant marine hardly thinks 
about ship scrapping; the vessel is sold, and then it 
is effectively forgotten. The purchaser takes liability 
for everything, with the majority of the steel being 
recycled and other components sourced for spares 
or raw materials. While the majority of a nuclear 
powered vessel could, in broad terms, be treated the 
same way, this is only after removing the parts of 
the vessel which pose an ionizing radiation risk, 
typically referred to as contaminated waste. At the 
end of a nuclear facility’s life, the plant has 
accumulated a considerable amount of activated 
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material, along with the depleted core, which has to 
be treated appropriately. Varying degrees of 
radioactive waste are created: 
 
 High level waste is the by-product of fission in 
the core and what has happened to the nuclear 
fuel after it is ‘spent’. This represents about 1% 
of contaminated material. This percentage 
equates to the UK nuclear industry producing 
an amount of high-level waste equivalent in 
volume to a taxi each year.  
 
 Intermediate-level waste is far less radioactive 
than high-level waste. Intermediate-level waste 
is made up of such things as fuel cladding 
material and sludge that come from the nuclear 
reprocessing treatment processes. Intermediate 
waste accounts for around 19% of contaminated 
waste.  
 
 Low-level wastes are components of the reactor 
circuit which have become radioactive from 
exposure to neutron radiation from reactor 
operation. This waste is also generated from 
exposure, generally within a nuclear facility, 
and includes items such as shoe covers and 
clothing, wiping rags, mops, filters, reactor 
water treatment residues, equipment, tools and 
luminous dials. Similar low-level waste is 
generated in medical treatment and research, 
such as medical tubes, swabs, injection needles, 
syringes, and laboratory animal carcasses and 
tissues. Worldwide, low-level waste comprises 
90% of the volume of total nuclear waste, but 
only 1% of the total radioactivity.  
 
Waste has to be stored appropriately until it 
becomes safe or is subjected to reprocessing, as 
discussed in relation to the nuclear fuel cycle [3]. 
How it becomes safe is by natural decay, where the 
waste material effectively loses its radioactive 
energy. An analogy of radioactive decay would be a 
car battery, losing its power when it is not used for 
several months. Nothing happens to the physical 
state of the battery; it simple loses its electrical 
charge. The same is true of radioactive waste, but 
the time period for it to become safe takes much 
longer. The waste, however, remains to all intents 
and purposes, physically intact. While the waste 
loses its energy, it needs to be shielded, so waste 
depositories tend to be quite large places with small 
amounts of contaminated material surrounded by 
large voluminous structures to absorb the harmful 
ionizing radiation.  
 
There are significant costs associated with 
decommissioning. While the volume of 
contaminated waste is small, there is a cost to the 
process and the ongoing storage of waste. The 
ownership of waste is also an issue that requires 
addressing.  
 
There are typically three ways of undertaking 
decommissioning: 
 
 Immediate dismantlement: soon after the 
nuclear facility closes, equipment, structures, 
and portions of the facility containing 
radioactive contaminants are removed or 
decontaminated to a level that permits release 
of the property, such that it can be treated as 
any other ship. 
 Safe Storage: often considered delayed 
dismantling. The ship would be stored and 
monitored in a condition that allows the 
radioactivity to decay; afterwards, it is 
dismantled. 
 Entombed: the radioactive contaminants of 
land based plant are permanently encased on 
site in a structurally sound material such as 
concrete and appropriately maintained and 
monitored until the radioactivity decays to a 
level permitting restricted re-use of the 
property. From a ship perspective this could 
take a number of different routes, from deep 
dispersal at sea to removal of certain ship 
sections and encasement.  
There may be some mixing of the first two methods, 
which would limit the cost of decommissioning. 
While the cost of decommissioning would appear to 
be expensive, the total life cycle costs have to be 
considered. The large quantity of CO2 produced by 
ships’ engines throughout their life also has to be 
considered. 
There are a number of examples from nature which 
would seem to suggest that containment of 
radioactive materials for very long periods of time 
is possible [3]. 
Through-lifecycle costs 
 
For a conventionally powered merchant ship, the 
costs are spread throughout its life, while for a 
nuclear powered vessel the costs are much more 
biased towards the initial purchase cost. Noting 
present day fuel costs, nuclear power is only 
comparable when considering through-life total 
costs. However, with the potential move to distillate 
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fuels and the imposition of carbon taxation, nuclear 
power becomes significantly more attractive. 
 
The differences in costing model for a nuclear ship 
would, therefore, imply that the philosophy 
associated with chartering rates would need to be 
re-evaluated.  
 
6. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 
One of the major stakeholders in this arena will be 
the relevant governments, which may only be a 
few, if fixed trade routes are considered. If a wider 
deployment of marine nuclear power is established, 
as for example in cruise ships or yachts, then 
significantly more countries will need to be 
involved. This political influence may be visibly 
limited to the technical aspects of safety; those 
which are environmental, operation and so on. 
However, the approach and methodology could 
vary significantly and be influenced by electoral 
and business interest. The two fundamental 
regulatory regimes could be either prescriptive or a 
goal-based safety case. 
 
During the 1970s, significant work was undertaken 
within the IMO which resulted in the adoption on 
November 19, 1981, of IMO Resolution A.491(XII) 
Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships. The 
purpose of the Code was to provide a technical and 
regulatory reference for nuclear merchant ships and 
supplement other applicable international 
conventions, codes and recommendations. The 
Code is still relevant today, even if some of the 
standards have been superseded. It defines specific 
safety issues which should be addressed, together 
with criteria to protect people and the environment 
from radiological hazards throughout all phases of 
a ship’s lifecycle: design, construction, 
commissioning, operation and decommissioning 
(scrapping). One of the most significant differences 
between this Code and most other IMO regulatory 
requirements is the concept of a Quality Assurance 
Programme (QAP) which would embrace the whole 
ship’s lifecycle. The QAP would be the 
responsibility of a single organisation; however, it 
should not prohibit transfer between bodies – 
transfer of class. 
 
The Safety section looks at a single failure criteria 
impacting on the safety of the nuclear power plant 
which can be addressed through redundancy, 
independence, segregation or diversity. Risk 
assessment is based on the principle of likelihood 
(frequency) against the consequence (impact), 
including decommissioning and loss, and recovery 
following loss of the ship. 
 
Within the Design Criteria and Conditions section 
of the Code there are three main aspects which have 
to be addressed for defined systems: shielding, heat 
removal and cooling the core. The Code defines 
each of the necessary safety functions for all plant 
process conditions. 
 
The section design aspects are primarily influenced 
by the radiation hazard to the space or the 
consequence from the design. The Ship’s Structure 
section deals with the nuclear plant, its effect on the 
structure locally and globally, while most other 
aspects supplement existing regulatory 
requirements: that is, stability (two compartment 
standard), fire and safety, navigation and so forth. 
Other sections of the Code cover nuclear steam 
supply, machinery and electrical installations, 
radiation safety, operation and surveying. The 
surveying requirements clearly define what is 
required during construction, trials, operation and 
decommissioning to the extent of defining the 
standards for pressure testing and the scope of non-
destructive examination. 
 
The six appendices of IMO Resolution A.491(XII) 
discuss, respectively: sinking velocity, seaway 
loads, safety assessment, dosage limits, quality 
assurance programme and application of a single 
failure. They expand significantly on how these 
aspects should be undertaken when referenced in 
the main body. 
 
Even though the nuclear environment has changed 
since the writing of the Code, most of the safety 
principles are pertinent today. However, there are a 
number of areas where ship safety has changed; for 
example it might be pertinent to use a probabilistic 
rather than deterministic approach for damage 
stability. 
 
It may not be appropriate, as with previous 
examples in the development of new ship types and 
radical engineering solutions, that standards are 
prescriptively developed. It might be more 
appropriate to ensure engineering capability is 
achieved while the risks to life and the 
environment, as far as practicable, are mitigated in 
an appropriately transparent manner: the 
methodology stated in IMO Resolution A.491(XII). 
This approach is consistent with the regulation of 
most land-based nuclear industries. Within this 
context, the marine industry could base its 
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approach on IMO Resolution A.491(XII) and, in 
particular circumstances, the INF Code.  
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
From the risk and regulatory aspects of nuclear 
propelled merchant ships the following has been 
concluded: 
 
1) The current international concerns relating to 
global warming and, in particular, the adverse 
situation concerning CO2, may provide an 
environmental driver for the promotion of 
nuclear based ship propulsion. This is because a 
nuclear propulsion system emits no CO2 during 
its operation. 
 
2) Governments are presently discussing methods 
to address the CO2 issue, with some specifically 
mentioning that serious consideration should 
be given to the nuclear propulsion of ships. 
Governmental interest in nuclear power is 
being paralleled in a number of areas within the 
marine industry. 
 
3) Nuclear power is a proven marine propulsion 
technology, both in the military and merchant 
services. In the case of the merchant ships, 
following an initial flurry of activity in the 
1960s there has been a steady, but low-level, 
activity continuing up to the present time. 
Notwithstanding this, approximately one third 
of the 600 or so nuclear reactors in operation 
today are serving at sea. 
 
4) There exist today at least two nuclear propelled 
ships which undertake passenger cruising 
duties during the summer and ice breaking 
functions in the winter. The newest of these 
ships was commissioned in 2007 and there is an 
ongoing build programme . 
 
5) To date, most marine experience has been 
derived from PWR systems.   
 
6) There are a number of public perception issues 
which will need to be addressed. While dealing 
with these issues will not be easy, it is believed 
that they will not be insurmountable.  
 
7) Port and flag state responses will be significant 
in the future development of nuclear 
propulsion. However, it is apparent that some 
countries, and by implication port states, are 
prepared to admit nuclear propeller ships into 
their ports. 
8) There are, however, specific issues with nuclear 
propulsion which need to be addressed. 
Nevertheless, models for this exist. Specific 
issues include:  
 
a. training and culture of ships’ crews and 
shore based staff  
b. recovery of irradiated fuel and 
decommissioning  
c. spares and maintenance.  
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